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I. INTRODUCTION
International commercial arbitration, as the preferred
method of dispute resolution1 has attained its popularity over
litigation, among other reasons, due to the autonomy of the
parties to design the tribunal and its process, to resolve disputes in a neutral territory in a speedy manner, and to easily
enforce international awards.2 The importance of the law of a
“neutral” locus arbitri is widely accepted3 as in most cases the
law of the seat governs the arbitration.4 Not only does lex arbitri affect the procedural matters of the arbitration, but courts
at the seat are also authorized to vacate awards in accordance
with the law of the seat of arbitration.5 Due to such importance
of national arbitration statutes and for the purposes of “harmonization and improvement”6 of national laws on international commercial arbitration, in 1985, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter
“UNCITRAL” or “Commission”) adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter “Model Law”).7
Nowadays, the Model Law represents the best “prototype”
1

TIBOR VÁRADY, JOHN J. BARCELÓ III & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1
(3d ed. 2006); GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 1, ¶1.01 (2004).
2
Margaret Wang, Are Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods Superior
to Litigation in Resolving Disputes in International Commerce? 16 ARB. INT’L
189, 199 (2000).
3
RICHARD GARNETT, HENRY GABRIEL, JEFF WAINCYMER & JUDD EPSTEIN, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 20 (2000);
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS 457 (2d ed. 2001).
4
ALAN REDFERN, J. MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE
PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2, ¶¶1.061.07 (2009).
5
GARNETT, GABRIEL, WAINCYMER & EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 66, 113;
PETROCHILOS, supra note 1, at 8, ¶1.20.
6
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS
ADOPTED IN 2006, Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the
1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as amended in
2006, at 23, ¶2, U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2006) [hereinafter Model Law].
7
Model Law, supra note 6; U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Report of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its
eighteenth session, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex
I (Aug. 21, 1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
commission/sessions/18th.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
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of a law on international commercial arbitration8 ostensibly
successful in achieving its goal of harmonization of national
laws.9 Among others, party autonomy,10 separability, the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz,11 and limited scope of court intervention, lie at the heart of the Model Law and shall be respected by each enacting country.12
Having become a “common feature of international arbitration,” jurisdictional challenges and related procedural rights
have been of growing importance in international commercial
arbitration.13 While some parties boycott arbitration proceedings, others do not or fail to make use of all remedies available
to them at the seat of arbitration.14 Legal literature sets out
several methods of challenging jurisdiction: (1) boycotting the
arbitration and once award is made, seeking to (i) annul the
award or (ii) resist enforcement (2) raising the objections with
the tribunal, (3) applying to national court to determine jurisdiction.15 However, opting for one specific strategy to challenge
jurisdiction of a tribunal may result in preclusion of remedies
8

PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS 13, ¶1-009 (3d ed.
2009).
9
See Bola Ajibola, Differences between the United Kingdom Arbitration
Act 1996 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
21ST CENTURY 1, 12 (Robert Briner, L. Yves Fortier, Klaus Peter Berger &
Jens Bredow eds., 2001); Sources of International Commercial Arbitration in
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
108 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); Pieter Sanders, UNCITRAL's Model Law on International and Commercial Arbitration: Present
Situation and Future, 21 ARB. INT’L 443, 443 (2005).
10
ISAAK I. DORE, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION UNDER THE UNCITRAL
RULES: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 90 (1986).
11
William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan:
What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?, 12 ARB. INT’L
137, 149 (1996).
12
Binder, supra note 8, at 13, ¶1-009.
13
Stefan Michael Kröll, Recourse against Negative Decisions on Jurisdiction, 20 ARB. INT’L 55, 55 (2004); John Yukio Gotanda, An Efficient Method for
Determining Jurisdiction in International Arbitrations, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 13 (2001).
14
Stefan Michael Kröll, First Experiences with the New Austrian Arbitration Law, 23 ARB. INT’L 553, 570 (2007).
15
REDFERN, HUNTER, BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 4, at 202, ¶5.2.
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at a later stage, highlighting the importance of understanding
the exact procedural rights of the parties.16
While codifying the fundamental principle of KompetenzKompetenz17 in Article 16(1),18 the Mode Law drafters have
subjected such power of a tribunal to a subsequent court review, making the tribunal’s competence provisional.19 Before
state court says the final word on the question of jurisdiction,
however, parties need to go through “two-step” challenge procedure.20 Taking the stance of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,21
the Model Law requires parties to first make a plea on lack of
jurisdiction before the arbitral tribunal no later than submission of the statement of defense.22 Even more so, such plea
shall explicitly indicate that the party objects to jurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal.23
Apart from “exceptional circumstances”24 and sua sponte
decision on jurisdiction by the tribunal,25 after duly raising the

16

Gotanda, supra note 13, at 29.
Binder, supra note 8, at 214, ¶4-003; Park, supra note 11, at 149.
18
Model law, art. 16(1).
19
Model Law, art. 16(3); See GARNETT, GABRIEL, WAINCYMER & EPSTEIN,
supra note 3, at 358; Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 (Jul. 13, 2007) (Can.).; GPEC International Ltd. v. Canadian Commercial Corporation, [2008] F.C. 414 (Apr. 2, 2008) (Can.).; International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) v. Tripal Systems Pty. Ltd., [1994]
R.J.Q 2560 (Sept. 9, 1994) (Can.).; PT Tugu Pratama Indonesia v. Magma
Nusantara Ltd, [2003] SGHC 204, [2003] 4 SLR(R) 257, (Sept. 10, 2003) (Singapore).
20
See Binder, supra note 8, at 217, ¶4-012.
21
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. GAOR, 65th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/65/465, art. 23(2) (Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules].
22
HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 481 (1989).
23
Stavros Brekoulakis & Laurence Shore, United Nations Commission
On International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law On International
Commercial Arbitration, 1985/2006, in CONCISE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
581, 614 (Loukas A. Mistelis ed., 2010); see CLOUT case No. 148, parties unknown, Moscow City Court (Feb. 10, 1995).
24
Public Policy and arbitrability exception from art. 16(2) further elaborated in section 2.3 of the article.
25
Model Law impliedly allows the tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction sua
spone in case of “doubts or questions as to its jurisdiction.” See U.N. Doc.
A/40/17, supra note 7, at 30, ¶150; Binder, supra note 8, at 215, ¶4-007.
17
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plea on lack of jurisdiction26 the tribunal has discretion to rule
on its jurisdiction either as a preliminary question or in an
award on the merits.27 Subsequent procedural remedies of the
parties are shaped according to the tribunal’s use of discretion.
When the tribunal decides to rule on the matter of jurisdiction together with the merits of the case, the review of such decision may be sought in setting-aside proceedings under Article
3428 of the Model Law or enforcement proceedings under Article 3629 of the Model Law.30 In the opposite case, when the tribunal bifurcates the proceedings and renders a preliminary decision confirming its jurisdiction, the Model Law introduces an
immediate court’s control of such ruling through Article 16(3).31
The decision of the court is not subject to appeal, save for exceptions such as Singapore, allowing for appeal with the leave
of the High Court.32 While this remedy under Article 16(3) of
the Model Law was deemed as an “innovative and sensible
compromise”33 purportedly directed towards faster resolution
of jurisdictional issues and obtaining legal certainty, in effect
the Model Law has provoked ambiguity by being silent on the
26

Preclusive nature of Article 16(2) further elaborated in Chapter III,
sub-section C of the article.
27
Model Law, art. 16(3); see Binder, supra note 8, at 219, ¶4-017; KLAUS
PETER BERGER, ARBITRATION INTERACTIVE: A CASE STUDY FOR STUDENTS AND
PRACTITIONERS 71, ¶5-16 (2002).
28
Model Law, art. 34(1).
29
Model Law, art. 36(1)(a)(i).
30
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Analytical commentary on draft text
of a Model Law on international commercial arbitration, Report of the Secretary-General, 40, ¶12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264 (Mar. 25, 1985) available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/sessions/18th.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); Model Law, supra note 6, at 30, ¶25; Marianne Roth,
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in
PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 953,
1025, ¶14.269 (Frank-Bernd Weigand ed., 2d ed. 2009).
31
Model Law, art. 16(3); see U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW,
UNCITRAL 2012 DIGEST ON THE MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION at 79, ¶15, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.9 (2012); Roth, supra note 30,
at 1025, ¶14.269.
32
International Arbitration Act, enacted on Jan. 27, 1995, (Singapore),
Chapter 143A, §10(4), [hereinafter SIAA]: “An appeal from the decision of the
High Court made under Article 16(3) of the Model Law or this section shall lie
to the Court of Appeal only with the leave of the High Court.”).
33
HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 22, at 486.
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consequences of failure to use this remedy.34
Stemming from the nature of international arbitration, the
lex loci arbitri should be understandable, predictable and easily
ascertainable as these laws are also designed for foreign parties, counsels and arbitrators.35 Defeating this purpose, the
courts throughout the Model Law jurisdictions have come to
contradictory results while interpreting relevant adoptions of
Article 16(3) of the Mode Law and have failed to develop a uniform approach towards preclusive effects of failure to raise objections within the timeline.36 While German and Canadian
courts tend to interpret the article as to have preclusionary effect on subsequent stages, a recent case of the Singapore Court
of Appeal has taken far-reaching step in interpreting Article
16(3) not to be an exclusive remedy in case of tribunal’s issuance of positive preliminary ruling on its jurisdiction. The court
has based its interpretation on the ground of “choice of remedies” policy i.e. parties choice between “active” and passive”
remedies. Active remedy is to be understood as an attack on
the award through initiating setting aside proceedings, 37 while
passive remedy is defense against recognition and enforcement
of the award. 38
Not only the courts, but the scholars have also been unable
to observe the uniform interpretation of Article 16(3). Literature has not yet analyzed the question from the standpoint of
whether the mechanism falls under the policy of the “choice of
remedies.” In light of such ambiguity, this article attempts to
explore the preclusive effect of Article 16(3) of the Model Law
on post award stages and to determine is exclusive character as
the remedy to challenge positive jurisdictional ruling of the tribunal.
In search of actual consequences of (mis)use of the availa34

UNCITRAL 2012 Digest, supra note 31, at 82, ¶27; Kröll, supra note
13, at 55.
35
Gerold Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Law: A Good Model of
a Model Law, 3 UNIF. L. REV. 483, 487-488 (1998).
36
UNCITRAL 2012 Digest, supra note 31, at 82, ¶27.
37
PT First Media TBK (formerly known as PT Broadband Multimedia
TBK) v. Astro Nusantara International BV and others and another appeal,
[2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶22 (Oct. 31, 2013)(Singapore) [hereinafter Lippo v. Astro].
38
Id.
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ble remedies, Chapter II of the foregoing article starts by exploring whether the Model Law implies “choice of remedies”
policy by examining its travaux préparatoires (hereinafter
“travaux”). It also seeks to determine existence of “alternative
system of defences” at cross-border level between remedies at
the seat of arbitration and in the enforcement country. Chapter
III engages in a determination of general framework of preclusions under the Model Law by analyzing specific provisions
such as Article 4, 13 and 16(2).
Chapter IV, by analyzing the travaux, determines the primary purpose of the Model Law. It further engages in analysis
and discussion of what may affect purported preclusionary nature of Article 16(3) by looking at the form of the preliminary
ruling, language of the article and analyzing time limit provided therein.
Subsequently, Chapter V examines the correlation between Article 16(3) and remedies against final award under the
Model Law. By detailed analysis of travaux, the article determines whether Article 16(3) should fall under the purported
“choice of remedies” policy or rather under the framework of
preclusion of the Model Law. The chapter engages in examination of pertinent case law and literature in order to reach the
conclusion on the preclusiveness Article 16(3) of the Model Law
on post-award stages.
Finally, the article provide author’s conclusion on the preclusive nature of Article 16(3) of the Model Law and proposes a
possible solution in order to address the problem of ambiguity
and inconsistency.
II. “CHOICE OF REMEDIES” POLICY
The decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in the case
of PT First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV39
represents an important precedent for analyzing “choice of
remedies” policy and interpreting the nature of Article 16(3) of
the Model Law. However, it is worth noting that the case mostly concentrated on the determination of enforcement frame39

Lippo v. Astro, [2013] S.G.C.A. 57.

7
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work for domestic international awards40 rendered in Singapore under section 19 of the International Arbitration Act
(hereinafter “SIAA”)41 as well as other matters unrelated for
the discussion of this article.42
In this case, the Arbitral tribunal seated in Singapore was
asked to decide on a dispute related to a failed joint venture between Malasian Astro Group of companies (hereinafter “Astro”)
and Indonesian Lippo Group of companies (hereinafter “Lippo”).43 In May 2009, the tribunal issued a preliminary award
confirming its jurisdiction in response of jurisdictional challenge raised by Lippo.44 The latter did not challenge this preliminary award in accordance with Article 16(3) of the Model
Law and fully participated in the proceedings. The arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of the claimant on merits. Only after expiry of the time for an application to set aside the awards did
Lippo resist enforcement of the domestic international awards
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal.45
During enforcement proceedings, among other questions
described above, the Singapore Court of Appeal was faced with
the dilemma of whether failure to raise a challenge under Article 16(3) precluded the party from challenges during setting
aside or enforcement proceedings. In answering the question in
40

Singapore has dual system for domestic and international arbitrations.
SIAA does not define what “domestic” arbitration is. It defines “international
arbitration” under § 5(2). Even when parties to arbitration are Singaporean
companies with their place of business in Singapore, the arbitration still can
be deemed as international. Such awards will qualify as domestic international awards subject to enforcement in Singapore under relevant SIAA provisions (corresponding to the Model Law articles). See Michael Tselentis, Michael Lee and David Lewis, Singapore, in ARBITRATION WORLD
JURISDICTIONAL COMPARISONS 487, 487 (J. William Rowley ed., 3d ed. 2010);
Christopher Lau, Singapore, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 693, 693, ¶10.01 (Frank-Bernd Weigand ed., 2d ed.
2009).
41
SIAA, § 19: “An award on an arbitration agreement may, by leave of the
High Court or a Judge thereof, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment
or an order to the same effect and, where leave is so given, judgment may be
entered in terms of the award.”
42
Lippo v. Astro, [2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶¶1-3, 5-9.
43
Astro Nusantara International BV and others v. PT Ayunda Prima Mitra and others, [2012] S.G.H.C. 212, ¶19 (Oct. 22, 2012) (Singapore) [hereinafter Astro v. Lippo].
44
Id. ¶29.
45
Id. ¶¶34, 37-64.
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a negative manner, the Singapore Court of Appeal reversed the
decision of the Singapore High Court and concluded that
“choice of remedies” was an underlying policy of the Model Law
and was even at the “heart of its entire design.”46 The court established that, similar to an application for setting aside, failure to use Article 16(3) remedy has no consequence of preclusion on the right to resist the enforcement of an award.47 Due
to its far-reaching interpretation, Lippo v. Astro decision has
been under the spotlight in the international arbitration community.
Before this decision, the leading German judgment on the
preclusionary nature of Article 16(3) of the Model Law was
from the German Federal Supreme Court (Der Bundesgerichtshof),48 concluding that failure to raise a plea within
the time limit, precludes further challenges during setting
aside or enforcement proceedings.49 It could be argued, however, that the explicitly preclusive approach of German courts is
due to the peculiarity of the German adoption of the Model
Law. Namely, after the legal reform of 1998, their new arbitration law has been fully based on the Model Law integrated in
the German Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “ZPO”).50 The
new German law does not provide an autonomous national regime for domestic and foreign awards and explicitly requires
parties to challenge an award by request of setting aside.51
46

Lippo v. Astro, [2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶65.
Id. ¶¶71, 116.
48
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 27, 2003,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW], 133, 2003 (Ger.) [hereinafter
“Bundesgerichtshof”].
49
See other German cases as well as conclusion on relevance of German
case law and effect of German adoption of the Model law in Chapter V, subsection B(1) of the article.
50
Inka Hanefeld, Germany, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRAITON 475, 475, ¶7.01 (Frank-Bernd
Weigand ed., 2d ed. 2009).
51
German Code of Civil Procedure [ZPO][Zivilprozessordnung], enacted
on Jan. 1, 1998 (Ger.), Book 10, § 1060(2): “An application for a declaration of
enforceability shall be refused and the award set aside if one of the grounds
for setting aside under section 1059 subs. 2 exists.” JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET &
SÊBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 804
(Stephen Berti, Annetter Ponti trans., 2d ed. 2007); Stefan Michael Kröll, Introduction to §§ 1060, 1061, in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN
47
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However, whether this particularity of the German law has
any effect on preclusiveness of Article 16(3) of the Model Law is
subject to further discussion.
While determination of the nature of Article 16(3) of the
Model Law represents the main aim of this article, the analysis
cannot take place without understanding the framework under
which this remedy operates. Thus, before going further with
the detailed analysis, the present chapter will examine the existence of “choice of remedies” policy under the Model Law and
the Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards of 1958 (hereinafter “NY Convention” or “Convention”).52
A. “Choice of Remedies” under the NY Convention and
preclusion in case of non-exhaustion of remedies at the seat
Before moving to the Model Law, this article will undergo
a general overview of the system provided under the NY Convention with regards to co-relation of “active” and “passive”
remedies.
Apart from two grounds exercisable by the enforcing courts
ex officio,53 Article 5 of the NY Convention has limited grounds
for using a “passive” remedy to resist recognition and enforcement of foreign awards based on five deficiencies.54 While such
an exclusive system of enforcement is provided, the Convention
grants parties the right to enforce awards under “more favorable” domestic law.55 The rationale behind such provisions has
been to make enforcement easier, serving the “pro-enforcement
bias”56 of the Convention.57 Although designed mainly for enPRACTICE 479, 483-484, ¶10 (Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Stefan M. Kröll & Patricia Nacimiento eds., 2007).
52
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter NY Convention or Convention].
53
NY Convention, art. 5(2)(a)-(b).
54
NY Convention, art. 5(1)(a)-(e).
55
Id. art. 7(1); Dirk Otto, Article VII, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION 444, 448-449 (Herbert Krokne, Patricia Nacimiento, Dirk Otto &
Nicola Christine Port eds., 2010).
56
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958 267 (1981). The principle underlying the NY Convention to encourage
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forcing awards coming from other jurisdictions,58 the NY Convention is itself silent on the question of whether a party may
resist enforcement of the award when the latter has failed to
use remedies available at the seat of arbitration. Case law only
demonstrates divergence of opinions on this issue.
Prior to enactment of the Arbitration Law on January 1,
1998, the attitude of German courts towards enforcement of
foreign awards in Germany was dependent on the use of remedies available at the place of arbitration.59 Federal Supreme
Court had held in a number of cases that for successful resistance of enforcement of the award in enforcement proceedings in Germany, parties had to make use of all remedies existing at the place of arbitration.60 After adoption of the new law,
courts have come to divergent views regarding this issue. One
line of cases has interpreted silence of the NY Convention on
preclusion as an indication of choice existing between the remedies of requesting annulment and of resisting enforcement of
the award.61 The other stream of German cases, however, has
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is known as “pro-enforcement
bias.” See M/S Brennan v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (U.S.); See
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (U.S.).
57
Otto, supra note 55, at 452.
58
Article 1(1) of the NY Convention also provides for possibility to enforce non-domestic awards. See NY Convention, art. 1(1): “It shall also apply
to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought.”
59
German law does not provide autonomous national regime for domestic
and foreign awards and regulates them separately. While domestic arbitral
awards fall under § 1059 of German ZPO, foreign awards are enforced under
the NY Convention (reference made in § 1061 of German ZPO). See Kröll, supra note 51, at 483-484, ¶10.
60
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jun. 26, 1969,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 184, 1969 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 21, 1971, NEUE
JURISTICHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 153, 1971 (Ger.); Bundesgerichtshof
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 10, 1984, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2763, 1984 (Ger.); see also Kröll, supra note 14, at
570.
61
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Dec. 10, 2010,
NEUE JURSTICHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2011, 1290 (Ger.); Bayerusches
Oberstes Landesgericht [BayObLG] [Bavarian Higher Regional Court], Mar.
16, 2000, 4 Z Sch 50/99, RPS 2/2000 (Ger.) in 27 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 445 (2002);
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Schleswig, Mar. 30, 2000,
16 SchH 5/99, RIW 2000, 706 (Ger.) in 31 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 652 (2006).
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paid particular attention to a comparison of the levels of protection available in Germany and the seat of arbitration the
time limit to request setting aside, and the existence of “more
favorable provisions” principle under the NY Convention to arrive at the conclusion that failure to exhaust remedies at the
seat results in preclusion to raise challenge during enforcement
stage.62
Courts in other jurisdictions have also come to contradictory decisions when dealing with the preclusion question. On the
one hand, all courts allowing choice between application of annulment of an award at the place of arbitration and resisting
enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction have based their line of
argumentation on the lack of explicit indication of preclusion in
the NY Convention.63 On the other hand, cases that have come
to opposite conclusions have elaborated more on the good faith
obligation under the NY Convention and the desirability of
making a challenge before the supervisory court at the place of
arbitration.64
Bearing in mind the above brief overview of the case law,
62

Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Karlsruhe, Mar. 27,
2006, 9 Sch 02/05, SchiedsVZ 2006, 335 (Ger.) in 32 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 342
(2007); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court)] Karlsruhe, Jul. 3,
2006, 9 Sch 1/06, SchiedsVZ 2006, 281 (Ger.) in 32 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 358
(2007); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Karlsruhe, Sept.
14, 2007, 9 Sch 02/07, SchiedsVZ 2008, 47 (Ger.) in 33 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 541
(2008); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Hamm, Sep. 27,
2005, 29 Sch 1/05, SchiedsVZ 2006, 106 (Ger.) in 31 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 685
(2006).
63
Paklito Investments Ltd. v. Klockner East Asia Ltd., [1993] 2 H.K.L.R.
39
(Jan.
15,
1993)
(Hong
Kong.),
available
at
http://arb.rucil.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=52; Smart Systems Technologies
Inc. (US) v. Domotique Secant Inc., [2008] Q.C.C.A. 444 (Can.) in 33 Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 464 (2008); Aloe Vera of America, Inc. v. Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd
and another, [2006] S.G.H.C. 78 (May 10, 2006) (Singapore); Newspeed International Ltd v. Citus Trading Pte Ltd, [2003] 3 S.L.R. 1 (Jun. 4, 2001)
(Singapore); Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, [2011] 1 A.C. 763 (P.C) (U. K.);
Hebei Import & Export Cop. v. Polytek Engineeinr Co. Ltd., [1999] 2 H.K.C.
205 (Feb. 9, 1999) (Hong Kong) in 14 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 652 (1999).
64
China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v. Gee
Tai Holdings Co. Ltd., [1994] 3 H.K.C 375 (Jul. 13, 1994) (Hong Kong.) in 10
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 671 (1995) [hereinafter China Nanhai Oil]; Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v. Government of the Republic of Lithuania & AB
Geonafta,
[2005]
EWHC
2437
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=1122&step=FullText.
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one apparent observation is that the desired uniformity under
the Convention is certainly defeated. Literature is also inconsistent on the existence of “choice of remedies” under the NY
Convention. While commentary on the NY Convention leans
towards preclusion when the basis for the defense during the
arbitration has not been established or a party has not challenged the preliminary ruling,65 nothing is explicitly stated
about the choice between active and passive remedies. Interestingly, on the 50th Anniversary of the NY Convention, Dr. Albert
Jan van den Berg proposed the Hypothetical Draft Convention
on the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
and Awards, stipulating that the Convention “is in need of
modernization.”66 One of the proposed amendments was the
addition of a waiver of a party to rely on grounds to challenge
enforcement. Introducing an express waiver provision to be included in the NY Convention, Dr. van den Berg advocated for
preclusion of bringing a challenge during the enforcement
stage in the event of failure to raise a challenge during earlier
proceedings and to exhaust remedies at the place of arbitration.67 Indeed, in light of the observation of Dr. Klaus Peter
Berger that dissatisfied parties generally use all remedies
available at the seat to have it annulled,68 it could be understandable why inaction could lead towards preclusion. However, keeping in mind the existing debate on the issue, this analysis lacks the necessary merit to conclusively generate a
definitive answer on the co-relation between the remedies under the NY Convention.

65

Patricia Nacimiento, Article V(1)(a), in RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION 205, 212 (Herbert Krokne, Patricia Nacimiento, Dirk
Otto & Nicola Christine Port eds., 2010).
66
Albert Jan van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards, in 50 YEARS OF
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES NO. 14 649, 649 (Albert
Jan van den Berg ed., 2009).
67
Id. at 664.
68
KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 9, 648
(1993).
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B. “Choice of Remedies” policy under the Model Law
While the research has failed to identify the existence of
preclusiveness under the NY Convention in case of failure to
use active remedies, this article will continue with an examination of the same issue at the national level under the Model
Law. For this purpose, the analysis will be based on an examination of the travaux of Articles 34 and 36 of the Model Law.
This section will exclusively deal with the existence of a general “choice of remedies” policy between remedies against the
final award, without any indication of an Article 16(3) mechanism being covered by the policy.
While the travaux generally represents only supplementary means of interpretation of legal texts, they still remain
one of the most important sources of interpretation and analysis of meaning behind a particular provision and/or a document
as a whole.69 Even the General Assembly highlighted the importance of the Model Law travaux, while the drafters explicitly requested that the Secretary-General of the United Nations
should provide governments with the travaux attached to the
text of the Model Law.70 Thus, we will give particular emphasis
to examining all the pertinent documents prepared during the
course of drafting the Model Law throughout this article.
Article 34 of the Model Law sets forth the standards according to which courts examine arbitral awards in annulment
proceedings.71 Designed as the sole means of recourse against
an award, regulating the process of vacatur was “amongst the
most difficult ones to be settled” during the drafting process.72
Subject to numerous discussions, the Working Group on International Contract Practices (hereinafter “Working Group”)
agreed to equate the grounds for setting aside to the ones
available for refusing to enforce an award under Article 5 of the
69

Jan Klabbers, International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance
of Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?, 50 NL. INT’L L. REV. 267,
288 (2003).
70
HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 22, at 15.
71
Id. at 911.
72
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General: possible features of a model law on international commercial arbitration, at 91, ¶107,
[1981] Y.B. UNCITRAL Vol. XII, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/207 (May 14, 1981),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
commission/sessions/14th.html (last visited April 17, 2015).
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NY Convention.73 The purpose of this article was to eliminate
different ways of “attacking” awards existing under various national laws. Sharing the spirit of the NY Convention, it was
agreed that the Model Law should only contain a single and exclusive possibility of recourse against the award in the form of
an application for setting aside.74 This principle was fully accepted.75 However, the Working Group and the Commission
observed that initiating or failure to commence setting aside
proceedings (an “exclusive recourse” to “actively” attack
awards) did not preclude parties from raising the same objection through the “passive” resistance to enforcement on the latter stage.76 The Analytical Commentary to the Model Law clarifies that:
[T]he application for setting aside constitutes the exclusive recourse to a court against the award in the sense that it is the only
means for actively attacking the award, i.e. initiating proceedings
for judicial review. A party retains, of course, the right to defend
himself against the award, by requesting refusal of recognition or
enforcement in proceedings initiated by the other party (articles
35 and 36).77
73

U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Working papers submitted to the
Working Group at its seventh session, Composite draft text of a model law on
international commercial arbitration: note by secretariat, at 226, [1984] Y.B.
UNCITRAL Vol. XV, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.48 (Mar. 6, 1984) [Fourth
Draft], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/
working_groups/2Contract_Practices.html (last visited April 17, 2015); U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, at 72, ¶6.
74
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/207, supra note 72, at 91, ¶108.
75
U.N. COMM. INT’L TRADE LAW, Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its fourth session,16 U.N. GAOR, at 4,
¶14,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.9/232
(Nov.
10,
1982),
available
at:
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/sessions/16th.html (last visited April 17, 2015).
76
U.N. Doc. A/40/17, supra note 7, at 12; U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE
LAW, Report of the Working Group on the work of its seventh session, at 204,
¶130, [1984] Y.B. UNCITRAL Vol. XV, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246 (Mar. 6, 1984)
[Fifth Draft], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/
sessions/17th.html (last visited April 17, 2015).
77
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, at 71, ¶2; See also U.N. COMM. ON
INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: note by the Secretariat, at 122, ¶41, [1988] Y.B. UNCITRAL Vol. XIX,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.9/309
(Apr.
20,
1988),
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/sessions/21st.html (last visit-
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Such co-existence of the two remedies has been agreed upon by countries commenting on the draft,78 has been reiterated
by the commentators on the Model Law,79 and are widely accepted in the modern arbitration world.80 However, the existence of only two different types of remedies is not automatically
suggestive of “choice” between them.
Egypt, while commenting on the text of the Model Law,81
highlighted that it would be the first time passive and active
remedies were available in one document, and further noted
that “the coexistence of two texts establishing two means of attacking the award based on the same grounds may cause confusion.”82 It was also correctly pointed out that neither Article
16,83 nor Article 34 or 36 prohibit a party from raising the objection on the same grounds (in this case on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction due to absence of arbitration agreement).84
Apparently, during the Seventh Session, the Working
Group considered amending Article 34(1) and adding the following language: “only by an application for setting aside [...] or
ed April 17, 2015).
78
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Analytical compilation of comments
by Governments and international organizations on the draft text of a model
law on international commercial arbitration, Report of the Secretary-General,
at 52, ¶14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263 (Jun. 17, 1985), available at:
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/sessions/18th.html (last visited April 17, 2015).
79
HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 22, at 912. While discussing the
issue of choice, the authors note “the Model Law should stipulate a single, exclusive method of juridical recourse against the award (other than resisting
recognition of or enforcement).”
80
UNCITRAL 2012 Digest, supra note 31, at 134, ¶1; Roth, supra note
30, at 1101, ¶14.521.
81
The comments were made on the Fifth Draft of the text. See U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/246, supra note 76, at 196, ¶49.
82
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Analytical compilation of comments
by Governments and international organizations on the draft text of a model
law on international commercial arbitration, Report of the Secretary-General Addendum, at 5-6, ¶¶19-20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263/Add.3 (Jul. 31, 1985),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/
sessions/18th.html (last visited April 17, 2015).
83
The Fifth Draft only contained the possibility to review the jurisdictional decision only at the post-award stage in setting aside proceedings. Immediate court review mechanism was not available and the quotation does
not affect the further analysis of the article on preclusiveness of Article 16(3)
of the Model Law. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246, supra note 76, at 196, ¶49.
84
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263/Add.3, supra note 82, at 4-5, ¶¶16-17.
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by a request to refuse recognition or enforcement in accordance
with Article 36.”85 This would mean that recourse could take
place via an application for setting aside, or in the alternative,
by requesting refusal of recognition and enforcement. However,
this proposition was not adopted since “recourse” has different
meanings in different languages, which did not fully correspond to raising objections under Article 36.86 On the same
session, the delegates heavily discussed the effect of co-relation,
in particular, whether failure to request setting aside precluded a party from resisting enforcement on the same grounds.87
Based on the discussions, the Working Group considered inclusion of the following wording in Article 36:
If an application for setting aside the award has not been made
within the time-limit prescribed in article 34(3), the party
against whom recognition or enforcement thereafter is sought
may not raise any other objections than those referred to in this
article, paragraph (1), subparagraphs (a)(i) or (v) or (b).88

While there were different views on whether such wording
should have been included in the Model Law, the prevailing position was against adoption of such a provision, since:
It was pointed out that the intended preclusion unduly restricted
the freedom of a party to decide on how to raise its objections. [...]
a party should be free to avail itself of the alternative system of defences which was recognized by the 1958 New
York Convention and should be maintained in the model
law.89

Supporting the prevailing view, the United States clarified
that the defense would either be “asserted in a setting aside
procedure, or in opposition to an application for recognition and
enforcement of the award.”90 The Explanatory Note of
UNCITRAL, as well as various literature, backs up the interpretation of an alternative existence of setting aside and en-

85

U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246, supra note 76, at 204, ¶127.
Id. at 212, ¶197.
87
Id. at 207, ¶¶153-154.
88
Id at 207, ¶153.
89
Id. at 207, ¶154.
90
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263, supra note 78, at 52, ¶¶14.
86
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forcement proceedings.91 Excluding the “choice of remedies”
policy by German legislators by virtue of section 1060 of the
German ZPO mentioned above is also an explicit indication for
existence of such a policy under the Model Law.
Therefore, concurring with the conclusion of Singapore
Court of Appeal, overall analysis of travaux indeed demonstrates the will of the drafters to allowing parties to have an
“alternative system of defenses.”92 However, it is important to
bear in mind that the policy only concerns choice between setting aside and enforcement proceedings, without any indication
of its extension to Article 16(3) of the Model Law.
III. GENERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PRECLUSIONS UNDER THE
MODEL LAW
Having established the existence of “choice of remedies”
policy under the Model Law, the present chapter identifies the
general attitude of the Model Law towards preclusionary matters by analyzing Article 4, Articles 13(2) and 13(3) and Article
16(2) of the Model Law.
A. Waiver under Article 4 of the Model Law and its effect on
post-award stage
Article 4 of the Model Law93 sets out the rule of an implied
waiver codifying the general principle of “estoppel” or “venire
contra factum proprium.”94 In order for the waiver to apply, the
following preconditions have to be met: (a) a procedural requirement in breach is contained in a non-mandatory provision
of the Model Law or in the arbitration agreement, (b) the party
in failure knew or ought to have known about the noncompliance, (c) objection to non-compliance is not presented
without undue delay or within the given time limit, and (d) the
party proceeds with the arbitration without any objections.95
91

Model Law, supra note 6, at 30, ¶26; Roth, supra note 30, at 1025,
¶14.269.
92
U.N. Doc. A/40/17, supra note 7, at 54, ¶274.
93
Model Law, art. 4.
94
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, at 17, ¶1; Brekoulakis & Shore,
supra note 23, at 593.
95
Binder, supra note 8, at 55-56, ¶1-082.
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While failure to use the Article 16(3) challenge mechanism
cannot fall under the rule of waiver, since it is not a procedural
discrepancy96 and is a mandatory provision,97 the effect of
waiver is of great relevance in favor of the preclusive nature of
such article. While a party “shall be deemed to have waived his
right to object” if the preconditions set out in Article 4 are met,
the Model Law is silent on the consequences of such a waiver.
In order to understand the Model Law approach towards this
end, this article will consult the travaux. The prevailing view of
the drafters on the effect of waiver was to be “extensive,”98 even
affecting the post-award stage i.e. annulment or enforcement
proceedings.99
The above interpretation of the Commission is further substantiated by the Model Law case law. In a German case, while
the holding of an oral hearing had been requested, the respondent failed to object to the arbitrator’s initiative to limit
proceedings to written submissions only.100 After the award
was rendered, the respondent resisted enforcement based on
procedural irregularities. However, High Regional Court of
Naumburg effectuated the preclusionary consequence of inaction under Article 4. In denying the motion to refuse enforcement, the court ruled that the party was barred from relying on
a procedural irregularity on subsequent stages when the latter
96

Brekoulakis & Shore, supra note 23, at 593.
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice], Feb. 24, 2005,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 157, 2005 (Ger.); See also Peter
Huber, Competence of Arbitral Tribunal to Rule on its Jurisdiction, in
ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 248, 249, ¶4 (KarlHeinz Böckstiegel, Stefan M. Kröll & Patricia Nacimiento eds., 2007).
98
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Working papers submitted to the
Working Group at its seventh session, Composite draft text of a model law on
international commercial arbitration: some comments and suggestions for
consideration: note by the secretariat, at 223, ¶11, [1984] Y.B. UNCITRAL
Vol. XV, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.50 (Mar. 6, 1984), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Contract_P
ractices.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
99
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246, supra note 76, at 210, ¶181; U.N. Doc. A/40/17,
supra note 7, at 13, ¶57; See also Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL's Work Towards a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 4 PACE L. REV.
537, 549 (1983-1984).
100
Oberlandesgericht [OLG][Higher Regional Court] Naumburg, Feb. 21,
2002, RECHTSPRECHUNG DER OBERLANDESGERICHTE IN ZIVILSACHEN, 71, 2002
(Ger.).
97
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had failed to raise an immediate objection previously.101 The
Supreme Court of Russian Federation, in annulment proceedings brought based on lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, precluded the respondent from raising the claim due to
failure to object in due time.102 Other jurisdictions have similarly confirmed such an extensive effect of the waiver during
post-award stage.103 Thus, based on the aforementioned, the
effect of waiver extends not only to subsequent arbitration proceedings, but also to the post-award stage.
B. Preclusion under Articles 13(2) and 13(3) of the Model Law
1. Article 13(2) of the Model Law
Article 13(2) of the Model Law sets out a fifteen-day rule
for challenging the arbitrator before the tribunal itself. The
time starts running after constitution of the arbitral tribunal or
the moment when the party became aware of the circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts for challenge.104 Still silent
on the issue of consequences of failure to raise a timely challenge, travaux demonstrate that there have been explicit proposals to clarify in the text that failure to raise an objection
within the set time limit shall result in preclusion in both setting aside as well as enforcement proceedings.105Although the
proposal was not explicitly addressed in the text of the Model
Law, Holtzmann and Neuhaus have clarified the effect of fail-

101

Id.
CLOUT case No. 637, parties unknown, Presidium of the Supreme
Court of the Russian Federation [2004] Mezhdunarodnyy Kommerchiskiy Arbitrazh [International Commercial Arbitration] 11, (Nov. 24, 1999); see Binder, supra note 8, at 62, ¶1-103.
103
CLOUT case No. 266, Arbitration Court attached to the Hungarian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Case No. Vb/97142, May 25, 1999
(Hun.) in 25 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 545 (2000).; Oberlandesgericht [OLG][Higher
Regional Court] Stuttgart, July 16, 2002, RECHTSPRECHUNG DER
OBERLANDESGERICHTE IN ZIVILSACHEN, 84, 2002 (Ger.)
104
Model Law, art. 13(2): “Failing such agreement, a party who intends to
challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen days after becoming aware of the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal or after becoming aware of any circumstance referred to in article 12(2), send a written statement of the reasons for
the challenge to the arbitral tribunal.”
105
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263, supra note 78, art. 13, ¶2(4).
102
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ure to raise timely challenge as being preclusive.106 According
to the authors, since respecting the time limit is one of the preconditions for challenge, after its expiry a party should be
barred from bringing a challenge.107 The commentators also
justified such a conclusion from a policy perspective and assumed that a party may not be given the right to attack an
award during annulment proceedings or to resist enforcement,
if the latter did not make a relevant challenge at the initial
stage.108
2. Article 13(3) of the Model Law
Travaux has demonstrated a significant role that Article
13(3) of the Model Law has played in adopting the immediate
court review mechanism under Article 16(3).109 When the challenge is unsuccessful under the mechanism described above,
Article 13(3) of the Model Law gives parties the right to challenge the decision of the tribunal before the state court within
thirty days.110 Similar to Article 16(3), the decision of the court
is “subject to no appeal” and the arbitral tribunal has discretion to continue proceedings while the request is pending before the court.111 Both provisions are in addition considered to
be mandatory.112
Although travaux contains limited information on the preclusiveness of Article 13(3), it speaks of “last resort to the
court” when challenging under this provision.113 However, as
correctly pointed out by the Singapore Court of Appeal, no further clarification is indicated elsewhere in the travaux.114
106

HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 22, at 408.
Id.
108
Id. at 409.; See also Heinz Strohbach, Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and Making of the Award, in UNCITRAL’S PROJECT FOR A MODEL LAW
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 103, 112, ¶14 (ICCA Congress
Series no. 2, Pieter Sanders ed., 1984).
109
U.N. Doc. A/40/17, supra note 7, art. 16, at 32, ¶161.
110
Model Law, art. 13(3).
111
Id.
112
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, art. 13, at 32, ¶2; Huber, supra
note 97, at 249, ¶4.
113
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, art. 13, at 33, ¶5.
114
Lippo v. Astro, [2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶¶126-128.
107
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However, the court failed to observe that the case law is indicative of preclusive effect of failure to raise challenge within the
time limit of Article 13(3) of the Model Law.
The Superior Court of Quebec, in a case from 2003, determined that failure to bring a challenge within the appropriate
timeframe did not preclude a party from raising a challenge
subsequently.115 In fact it concluded that the timeline is not
mandatory and thus can be extended by the court and did not
cover the issue of preclusiveness. Even if this case is interpreted to support the contention that Article 13(3) of the Model
Law is not preclusive, other cases described below tend to disagree with such an interpretation.
In annulment cases before them, Quebec and Jordanian
courts held that a party is precluded from the possibility of
challenging the validity of an award in setting aside and enforcement proceedings if the latter failed to raise a challenge
pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Model Law.116 The Federal
Court of Justice of Germany also confirmed that, unless challenge of arbitrator takes place within a one-month period, for
the purposes of legal certainty and avoidance of undermining
the challenge proceedings, a party is precluded from raising
challenge in the annulment or enforcement stages.117 Furthermore, the Austrian version of Article 13(3), which is a verbatim adoption of this article, has been deemed to preclude further recourse in case of failure to raise challenge within the
given time limit.118
115

Groupe de Charles Lacroix c. Syndicat des Travailleurs Horaires de
l’Amiante C.S.N. Inc., [2003] CanLII 35698, ¶5, 6, 56 (Can.), available at
http://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/qccs/doc/2003/2003canlii35698/2003canlii35698.ht
ml, referral in UNCITRAL 2012 Digest, supra note 18, at 69..
116

Habitations d’Angoulème Inc. v. Létourneau, [2005] Q.C.C.Q. 12888 (Can.);
Parties unknown, Supreme Court of Jordan, Case No. 1242/2007 (Nov. 7, 2007),
unpublished decision, referral in UNCITRAL 2012 Digest, supra note 18, at 63.
117

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 04, 1999,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2370, 1999 (Ger.).
118
Austrian Code of Civil Procedure [Zivilprozessordnung], enacted on
Aug. 1, 1895 (Aus.), Chapter IV, § 589(3): “If a challenge under any procedure
agreed upon by the parties or under the procedure of paragraph (2) of this Article is not successful, the challenging party may request, within four weeks
after having received the decision rejecting the challenge, the court to decide
on the challenge, which decision shall be subject to no appeal. While such a
request is pending, the arbitral tribunal, including the challenged arbitrator,
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In light of the above mentioned, failure to raise challenge
before the state court within the timeline provided by Article
13(3) of the Model Law is to be interpreted as preclusion to
raise subsequent challenges in setting aside, as well as enforcement proceedings.
C. Preclusion under Article 16(2) of the Model Law and its effect
on post-award stages
Finally, the procedural mechanism to challenge jurisdiction in the pre-award stage is given in Article 16(2) of the Model Law, which requires parties to bring the objection prior to
submission of the statement of defence.119 The Working Group
and the Commission unequivocally clarified the effect of failure
to raise a plea on jurisdiction within the timeframe set in Article 16(2) as having a preclusive effect on the post-award
stage.120
It is true that the suggestion to explicitly include the effect
of failure under Article 16(2) in the text of the Model Law was
denied in order to allow interpretation of this question by each
country adopting the Model Law.121 However, we should not
understand by this fact that the Model Law gives leeway in the
interpretation of the preclusive effect of Article 16(2). Rather
the drafters solely intended to make sure that such failure
could not result in preclusion in such exceptional circumstances as public policy or arbitrability.122 There is a general consensus among scholarly writings that a party should not act in
a way to give the impression that it accepts the jurisdiction, in
breach of principles of good faith and venire contra factum promay continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award.” See Benedikt
Spiegelfeld, Susanne Wurzer, Heidrun E. Preidt, Chapter II: The Arbitrator
and the Arbitration Procedure - Challenge of Arbitrators: Procedural Requirements, in AUST. Y.B. ON INT. ARB. 2010 45, 49 (Christian Klausegger, Peter Klein, et al. eds., 2010).
119
Model Law, art. 16(2).
120
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246, supra note 76, art. 16, at 14, ¶51; U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, art. 16, at 39, ¶¶8-9.
121
U.N. Doc. A/40/17, supra note 7, art. 34, at 56, ¶¶288-289.
122
Id. art. 34, at 56, ¶288; ARON BROCHES, COMMENTARY ON THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 81
(1990).
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prium and thus should raise the challenge of jurisdiction before
the tribunal within the set timeframe in Article 16(2).123
Case law is consistent on the preclusive nature of Article
16(2) of the Model Law as well. One of the first courts to rule
on the matter was the Moscow City Court, which gave the failure to object under the article preclusive power for challenges
on subsequent post-award proceedings.124 Courts in other jurisdictions, such as Canada and Germany, have also agreed
with the Russian courts as to the consequence of the failure to
object under Article 16(2).125 The underlying rationale in all
the cases has been the importance to determine jurisdiction at
an early stage and avoid the disruptive consequences of latent
challenges by the parties.
The only deviation from the stated preclusion policy has
been made by the drafters in relation to the “plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority” under Article 16(2) of the Model Law.126 According to the Model Law,
such a challenge shall be made “as soon as the matter alleged
to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings.”127 However, both the Commission in its report as well as the commentary to the article, suggest that failure to raise a plea on the grounds that the tribunal is exceeding
its jurisdiction may not preclude a party from bringing a challenge on the same basis in annulment or enforcement proceedings.128 The reason that the Commission came to this conclusion was two-fold. Firstly, there was a potential harsh effect on
123

See HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 22, at 483; BROCHES, supra
note 122, at 81; Roth, supra note 30, at 1104, ¶14.534; BERGER, supra note 68,
at 353.
124
CLOUT case No. 148, supra note 23.
125
CLOUT case No. 637, supra note 102; Kanto Yakin Kogyo KabushikiKaisha v. Can-Eng Manufacturing Ltd., [1992] 7 O.R. 3d 779, 791 (Can.);
Dunhill Personnel Systems Inc. v. Dunhill Temps Edmonton Ltd., [1994] 13
Alta. L.R. 3d 241 (Can.); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court]
Stuttgart, Dec. 20, 2001, 1 Sch 16/01 (1), unpublished decision (Ger.), available at http://www.dis-arb.de/en/47/datenbanken/rspr/olg-stuttgart-case-no-1sch-16-01-1-date-2001-12-20-id158 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
126
Model Law, art. 16(2).
127
Id.
128
U.N. Doc. A/40/17, supra note 7, art. 16, at 31, ¶ 155: “Failure to raise
the plea at an earlier time should not necessarily preclude its use in setting
aside proceedings or in recognition and enforcement proceedings.” See also
HOLZTMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 22, at 481.
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unsophisticated parties, who might be unable to realize the necessity of promptness of the plea.129 Secondly, due to differences in the governing law, in certain instances it is impossible
to determine that a matter is beyond the tribunal’s authority.130 These limitations were specifically directed towards the
particular mechanism of Article 16(2) and do not affect the
general stance of the Model Law on preclusion matters.
As a result of the above provided analysis, the research
leads towards establishing that principles of legal certainty,
good faith, quick and efficient decision-making131 underline the
Model Law and preclude parties from raising challenges in
subsequent proceedings when a specific timeframe for raising
such challenge is provided. Particular attention should be given
to Article 13(3) and 16(2) of the Model Law due to the impact
on the immediate court review mechanism under Article 16(3)
and the similarity of the question at hand (jurisdictional challenge under Article 16(2)).

IV. PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 16(3) OF THE MODEL LAW AND
EFFECTS ON ITS NATURE
Having established a “choice of remedies” policy on the one
hand and a general framework of preclusions under the Model
Law on the other, this chapter determines the main purpose
behind the Article 16(3) mechanism through detailed examination of the travaux. The article further elaborates on the effects
on the nature of Article 16(3) of the Model Law. Namely research analyzes if the form of the preliminary jurisdictional
ruling may have any effect on the preclusive nature of Article
16(3). Subsequently, the article examines the meaning of the
language used in Article 16(3) as well as the weight of the time
limit used in the provision.

129

U.N. Doc. A/40/17, supra note 7, art. 16, at 30, ¶ 155.
Id.
131
Huber, supra note 97, at 254, ¶20.
130
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A. Primary purpose of Article 16(3) of the Model Law
Departing from what was once a regular course of action,
to have judicial review of legality of the arbitration only after
the award was made,132 the nature of Article 16(3) is so controversial that even its travaux is ambiguous. Throughout the
drafting process of the Model Law, the issue of court control
over the decision on jurisdiction was certainly one of the most
debated.133 After highlighting the difficulty related to the possibility of subsequent court review of a tribunal’s jurisdiction,134 the Working Group reached an agreement to make tribunal’s jurisdiction provisional.135 However, the agreement
could not be easily reached on the question of what was the appropriate stage when the court control could take place.136
From early on, the draft text of the Model Law contained
an option for the tribunal to decide on its jurisdiction either as
a preliminary question or in an award on the merits.137 How132

UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 31, at 79, ¶15; La Companie Nationale
Air France v. Mbaye, [2003] CanLII 35834 (Can.); Simon Greenberg, Direct
Review of Arbitral Jurisdiction under the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: An Assessment of Article 16(3), in UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 49, 54 (Frédéric Bachand & Fabien
Gélinas eds., 2013).
133
Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL Adopts Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 2 ARB. INT’L 2, 5 (1986); HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 22, at 484.
134
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/207, supra note 72, at 88, ¶89.
135
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the work of its third session, at 21, ¶82,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.9/216
(Mar.
23,
1982),
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Contract_P
ractices.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
136
BROCHES, supra note 122, at 82.
137
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Note by the Secretariat: Model law on
International Commercial Arbitration: Draft articles 25 to 36 on award, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.38 (Aug. 31, 1982) [First Draft], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Contract_P
ractices.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015); U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW,
Note by the Secretariat: Model law on International Commercial Arbitration:
Revised draft articles I to XXVI, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.40 (Dec. 14,
1982) [Second Draft], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
commission/working_groups/2Contract_Practices.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2015); U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Model Law on international commercial arbitration: redrafted articles I to XII on scope of application, general
provisions, arbitration agreement and the courts, and composition of arbitral
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ever, the only possibility to contest such ruling on the jurisdiction was through an action for setting aside of the award.138
Early drafts also included Article 17, granting the parties the
possibility of concurrent court control,139 which was subsequently deleted by the Working Group.140 While removing the
provision, the Working Group reasoned that it was in conflict
with the main principle behind Article 16(3) of the Model Law,
which at that time allowed parties to contest positive jurisdictional rulings only through an application to set aside an
award.141
In commentaries on the fifth draft of the Model Law,142
Austria, Norway, Poland, Canada, Soviet Union and the IBA
suggested inclusion of a procedure allowing for an immediate
court review of the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction for the
purposes of saving time and money.143 The underlying ratribunal: not by the secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.45 (Sept. 9,
1983) [Third Draft], available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
commission/working_groups/2Contract_Practices.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2015); U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.48, supra note 73.
138
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.48, supra note 73, art. 16(3), at 223: “The
arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) either as a
preliminary question or in an award on the merits. [In either case, a ruling by
the arbitral tribunal that it has jurisdiction may be contested by any party only in an action for setting aside the arbitral award.].”
139
“The procedure by which an immediate application is made to the
courts, following an interim award on jurisdiction by the arbitral tribunal, is
known as ‘concurrent control,’” noted in Alan Redfern, The Jurisdiction of an
International Commercial Arbitrator, 3 J. INT’L. ARB. 19, at 32 (1986).
140
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.48, supra note 73, art. 17, at 223: “(1)
[Notwithstanding the provisions of article 16,] a party may [at any time] request the Court specified in article 6 to decide whether or not there exists a valid arbitration agreement and [, if arbitral proceedings have commenced,]
whether or not the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction [with regard to the dispute referred to it]. (2) While such issue is pending with the Court, the arbitral
tribunal may continue the proceedings [unless the Court orders a stay or suspension of the proceedings].”
141
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246, supra note 76, art. 17, at 196, ¶55.
142
Id. art. 16(3), at 196, ¶49: “The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) either as a preliminary question or in an award on
the merits. In either case, a ruling by the arbitral tribunal that it has jurisdiction may be contested by any party only in an action for setting aside the arbitral award.”
143
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263, supra note 78, art. 16, at 29-30, ¶¶7(a)-(d), art.
17, at 31, ¶10; U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Analytical compilation of
comments by Governments and international organizations on the draft text of
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tionale behind supporting immediate court control was twofold. First, it was to give arbitral tribunal flexibility to balance
in each particular case between the risks of dilatory tactics and
the waste of time and money.144 Secondly, there was a need for
the parties to an arbitration to gain certainty regarding the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.145
To accommodate two important purposes underlying Article 16(3), the Commission discussed several options for amending Article 16(3).146 After long deliberations the Commission
agreed to opt for the solution provided in Article 13(3) and
adopt the language in the same form as it appears now.147 Due
to its elements,148 the special mechanism adopted under Article
16(3) has been regarded as a suitable solution to balance conflicting policy considerations such as wasting time and money
on the one hand, and preventing dilatory tactics on the other,
while establishing certainty on the jurisdictional question.149
In reaching a compromise position on mechanism of Article
16(3), the Commission aimed at guaranteeing certainty on the
issue of jurisdiction and to avoid annulment of the award due
to lack of jurisdiction after having spent considerable money
and time on arbitral proceedings.150 Both Canada and the UK
attached great importance to an early determination of the ju-

a model law on international commercial arbitration, Report of the SecretaryGeneral - Addendum, art. 16, at 12, ¶2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263/Add.1 (Apr. 15,
1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/
sessions/18th.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
144
U.N. Doc. A/40/17, supra note 7, art. 16, at 31, ¶159.
145
Id. art. 16, at 31, ¶160.
146
Id.: “One suggestion was to adopt the solution found in article 13(3)
and thus to allow immediate court control in each case where the arbitral tribunal ruled on the issue of its jurisdiction as a preliminary question. Another
suggestion was to require the arbitral tribunal, if so requested by a party, to
rule on its jurisdiction as a preliminary question, which ruling would be subject to immediate court control. Yet another suggestion was to reintroduce in
the text previous draft article 17.”
147
U.N. Doc. A/40/17, supra note 7, art. 16, at 32, ¶161.
148
Time limit, finality of the decision and possibility to continue arbitral
proceedings while the court review is pending.
149
Mary E. McNerney & Carlos A. Esplugues, International Commercial
Arbitration: The UNCITRAL Model Law, 9 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 53
(1986).
150
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, art. 16, at 41, ¶13.
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risdictional issue for the same reasons as provided above.151
Canada even referred to the case of Arab Republic of Egypt v.
Southern Pacific Properties, Ltd., a case decided by the Paris
Court of Appeals in 1984 to highlight its point.152 The dispute
arose out of a contract to create touristic complexes in Egypt
that was concluded between the Arab Republic of Egypt and a
Hong Kong company, Southern Pacific Properties (SPP), to create two tourist complexes in Egypt.153 At the outset of the dispute, Egypt made express reservation regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal. After the tribunal rendered its final award,
Egypt brought an action to set it aside in France alleging that
it had never waived its immunity of jurisdiction.154 The court
finally decided to set aside the award. Bearing in mind the loss
of time and resources due to the latent challenge of the jurisdiction, Canada persisted to have an immediate court review
mechanism included in the Model Law.
In light of the background in drafting Article 16(3) of the
Model Law, the conclusion can thus be reached that the purpose of the mechanism under this provision was ensuring early
determination of jurisdiction, obtaining certainty on the jurisdictional issue in order to avoid a waste of time and resources,
and to avoid parties distracting the arbitration proceedings by
raising late challenges.155
The concerns of drafters in 1985 are still of relevance in
modern arbitration practice. In the previously cited Singapore
judgment, the Court of Appeals challenged the importance of
certainty on jurisdictional issues under the Model Law.156 The
court concluded that while certainty and efficiency were indeed
151

U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263/Add.1, supra note 143, art. 16, at 12, ¶2; U.N.
COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Analytical compilation of comments by Governments and international organizations on the draft text of a model law on international commercial arbitration, Report of the Secretary-General - Addendum, art. 34, 36, at 5, ¶17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263/Add.2 (May 21, 1985),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
commission/sessions/18th.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
152
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263/Add.1, supra note 143, art. 16, at 12, ¶2.
153
Arab Republic of Egypt v. Southern Pacific Properties, Ltd. et. al, 23
I.L.M 1048, 1049 (1984).
154
Id. at 1051.
155
Greenberg, supra note 132, at 78.
156
Lippo v. Astro, [2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶116.
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important, it was not intended to be at the expense of derogating from “choice of remedies” policy.157 The basis for concluding
that Article 16(3) is not “certainty-centric”158 was the existence
of the tribunal’s discretion to rule on jurisdiction as a preliminary matter or to decide together with the merits.
Although the Singapore court may be correct in stating
that the purpose of certainty would be best served if all jurisdictional decisions were made preliminarily, we should understand why the drafters did not pursue such a possibility. While
there was no consensus reached upon at which stage tribunals
should decide on jurisdiction,159 a general desirability of the
drafters of the Model Law towards preliminary decisionmaking can be observed.160 According to Analytical Commentary, jurisdictional questions would usually be decided separately.161 However, underlining that in some situations the
question of jurisdiction might be “intertwined with the substantive issue” the drafters left the possibility of combining the
ruling with the final award on the merits.162 Another reason to
retain the discretionary power was to avoid dilatory tactics to
obstruct arbitral proceedings in apparent situations of an unfounded plea of lack of jurisdiction.163 Thus, drafters had sufficient basis for leaving discretionary power to tribunals, limited
only to special circumstances and based on the prevailing view.
Some jurisdictions, such as Germany164 and Iran,165 have
taken general “desirability” to rule on the jurisdiction as a preliminary matter even further by explicitly providing for this in
157

Id.
Id. ¶117.
159
Gotanda, supra note 13, at 14.
160
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, at 40, ¶11.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
U.N. Doc. A/40/17, supra note 7, at 31, ¶159; see NADJA ERK, PARALLEL
PROCEEDINGS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE 183 (2014).
164
German ZPO, § 1040(3):“If the arbitral tribunal considers that it has
jurisdiction, it rules on a plea referred to in subsection 2 of this section in general by means of a preliminary ruling.”
165
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, enacted Nov. 5, 1997
(Iran), art. 16(3): “Where a plea is raised in respect of jurisdiction or the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement the “arbitrator” must (Unless
otherwise agreed by the parties), rule on a plea as a preliminary question and
before entering the merits of the case.”
158
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their national legislation enacting the Model Law. Based on the
prevailing view, leaving the discretionary power to the tribunal
is justified and cannot be deemed to contradict the purpose of
efficiency and certainty on jurisdictional matters.166 Therefore,
based on all the above, the purpose of Article 16(3) of the Model
Law is not undermined by the choice of the drafters to leave
room for the tribunal to decide the jurisdiction in certain cases
together with the merits.
B. Form of a preliminary jurisdictional ruling
Having determined the primary purpose of Article 16(3) of
the Model Law, further analysis of effects on its nature is necessary. One of the caveats of Article 16(3) of the Model Law is
lack of clarification on the form of the preliminary ruling,
which may become crucial for understanding the application of
Article 16(3) and its effects.167 While the Working Group highlighted that there would be important implications on Articles
34 and 16 if the term “award” was not defined, no such definition was adopted in the text,168 nor has arbitration scholarship
or practice been able to come up with a generally accepted definition thus far.169 Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, a
plain reading of the Model Law demonstrates the tribunal’s authority to issue preliminary or interim awards in addition to
the “final award.”170 The terms “interim,” “partial” and “preliminary” awards are generally used interchangeably and are usually granted to resolve one or more, but not all, claims and are

166

Greenberg, supra note 132 at 55; SIMON GREENBERG, CHRISTOPHER
KEE & J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
AN ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE 210, ¶5.32 (2011).
167
Brekoulakis & Shore, supra note 23, at 615.
168
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, at 72, ¶3.
169
JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KRÖLL,
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 628, ¶24-4 (2003);
REDFERN, HUNTER, BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 4, at 514, ¶9.05.
170
GARNETT, GABRIEL, WAINCYMER & EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 91; See also Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Stefan M. Kröll & Patricia Nacimiento, Germany
as a Place for International and Domestic Arbitrations - General Overview, in
ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 3, at 45, ¶107 (Böckstiegel, Kröll & Nacimiento eds., 2007).
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“final” for those matters resolved.171
When jurisdiction is determined in bifurcated proceedings,
giving the status of an “award” to a decision on jurisdiction
may have certain consequences.172 While the sole recourse
against an “award” may be an application for setting aside, the
mechanism under Article 16(3) departs from a post-award review of the decision and grants an immediate challenge possibility.
The Court of Appeal of Bermuda in Christian Mutual Insurance Co., v. Ace Bermuda Insurance Limited has made a farreaching decision concluding that there can be separate annulment proceedings other than that of Article 16(3), if the
form of an award is given to a preliminary ruling.173 If such interpretation were to be followed, literature suggests that then
every decision named “award” would fall outside the scope of
Article 16(3) and introduce the possibility of multiple court proceedings on the same decision: first, under Article 16(3); second, a separate setting aside of the award on jurisdiction (as
held in Ace Bermuda) and third, setting aside on the merits
under Article 34(2)(i).174
The travaux demonstrates the existence of a direct discussion on the question of form. Austria, Norway, and Poland have
suggested that there should be an opportunity to make a preliminary ruling in the form of an award, subject to immediate
court review.175 According to the Analytical Commentary,
while adopting the view of concurrent court control under Article 16(3), two forms of decision were foreseen: first, rendering
an award subject to immediate court control or second, preliminary decision subject to review together with the final award
on the merits.176 By adopting the mechanism of immediate
171

REDFERN, HUNTER, BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 4, at 515,
¶9.08; VÁRADY, BARCELÓ & MEHREN, supra note 1, at 709.
172
REDFERN, HUNTER, BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 4, at 514,
¶9.06.
173
Christian Mutual Insurance Co., Central United Life Insurance Co.,
Connecticut Reassurance Corp. v. Ace Bermuda Insurance Limited, [2002]
Bda L.R. 1 (Dec. 6, 2002) (Bermuda).
174
Alan Uzelac, Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal: Current Jurisprudence and Problem Areas Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, 5 INT. ARB. L.
REV. 154, 163 (2005).
175
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263, supra note 78, art. 16, at 29-30, ¶¶7(a)-(c).
176
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, art. 16, at 41, ¶14.
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court review, it can be assumed that the Commission impliedly
induced the form of a “preliminary award” to be given to such a
preliminary decision.
Confirming the accuracy of the above interpretation, courts
in various jurisdictions have established that the form of the
preliminary ruling has no effect on the application of Article
16(3) of the Model Law. The High Court of Hong Kong has affirmed in the case of Weltime Hong Kong Limited & Anor v.
Ken Forward Engineering Ltd, that
[a] ruling on jurisdiction, by its very nature, is a preliminary ruling which much precede an award on the merits. The fact that it
may be titled an "award" or an "interim award" does not mean it
ceases to be a preliminary ruling on jurisdiction, which it plainly
was.177

Hong Kong and Singapore courts have further ruled that,
in determining the application of Article 16(3), substance prevails over the form and the preliminary nature of the decision
was decisive for the immediate court review mechanism to
come into play.178 By way of comparison, while German courts
have not reached consensus on the form of a preliminary decision on jurisdiction itself,179 the prevailing view is, whatever
the form may be, it is still a preliminary ruling subject to challenge under § 1040(3) ZPO.180
Following the same rationale as previously referenced in
case law and the travaux, in searching for due framework for
the decisions on jurisdiction, literature clarifies that while the
“preliminary award” is the “’last word’ on the jurisdictional issue,” it is not the final award subject to setting aside under Article 34 and may only be challenged under Article 16(3) of the
Model Law.181 Furthermore, Dr. Huber advocates for “sui gene177

Weltime Hong Kong Limited v. Ken Forward Engineering Limited,
[2001] H.K.C.F.I. 831, [2001] 1 H.K.C. 458, ¶5 (Mar. 6, 2001) (Hong Kong).
178
The Incorporated Owners of TAK TAI Building v. Leung Yau Building
Limited, [2005] H.K.C.A. 87, [2005] 1 H.K.C. 530, ¶17 (Mar. 9, 2005) (Hong
Kong); PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v. Dexia Bank S.A., [2006]
S.G.C.A. 411, [2007] 1 S.L.R. 597 (Dec. 1, 2006) (Singapore).
179
Hanefeld, supra note 50, at 514, ¶7.152.
180
Böckstiegel, Kröll & Nacimiento, supra note 170, at 45, ¶108.
181
Huber, supra note 97, at 257, ¶4; Hanefeld, supra note 50, at 514,
¶7.152.
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ris which is only subject to court control under” the corresponding provision of Article 16(3) of the Model Law in German ZPO
§ 1040.182
Thus, jurisdictional rulings made in bifurcated proceedings
as a separate issue will always be subject to exclusive recourse
under Article 16(3) of the Model Law due to preliminary nature
of such ruling. If made, the decision of the court will have res
judicata effects on the subsequent proceedings.
C. Language and time limit of Article 16(3) of the Model Law
1. Non-mandatory language of Article 16(3) of the Model Law
Having determined that the form of the preliminary ruling
does not have much effect on the Article 16(3) mechanism coming into play, this section will further elaborate on how different elements of the provision influence its preclusiveness.
The language of Article 16(3) of the Model Law reads that
any party “may request ... the court ... to decide the matter.”183
The courts in Lippo v. Astro as well as in Tan Poh Leng Stanley
v. Tang Boon Jek Jeffrey184 interpreted this language to be indicative of its optional character. As a result, both courts concluded that failure to challenge does not result in preclusion to
raise challenge in subsequent proceedings.
It is true that generally, use of the word “may” is an indication of an option or a possibility.185 However, any interpretation of the language employed in the article should be put in
the context of, and discussed from the standpoint of, a legislative intent.186 Understanding the purpose of the Model Law
182

Huber, supra note 97, at 257, ¶4; See German ZPO, § 1040(3).
Model Law, art. 16(3).
184
Tan Poh Leng Stanley v. Tang Boon Jek Jeffrey, [2000] S.G.H.C. 260,
[2000] 3 S.L.R.(R), ¶1, (Nov. 30, 2000) (Singapore) [hereinafter “Tan Poh
Leng”].
185
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL
PRINCIPLES, VOLUME I at 1721 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993): “An instance of what
is expressed by the auxiliary verb may; a possibility.”; BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, at 993 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999): “This is the primary
legal sense ... ‘permissive’ or ‘discretionary.’”
186
BLACK’S LAW, supra note 185, at 993 “In dozens of cases, court have
held may to be synonymous with shall or must usually in an effort to effectuate legislative intent.”
183
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and the legislative intent behind it, the Singapore High Court
has in other cases interpreted the wording “may not” to be given the mandatory meaning of “cannot.”187 As the main purpose
of Article 16(3) of the Model Law was early determination of jurisdictional matter, certainty, and efficiency, making the remedy optional would, from the outset, defeat its very purpose.
When describing the nature of the challenge mechanism
employed by Article 16(3) of the Model Law, scholars have used
mandatory language such as “must be made”188 or “is forced to
have recourse.”189 However, the main question arises as to
whether, if in light of the legislative intent, other language
such as “shall” or “must” can be used to demonstrate a possible
preclusive effect of Article 16(3) of the Model Law. By way of
comparison, resorting to other provisions of the Model Law
may be relevant in determining the general language used by
the drafters to describe the non-alternative nature of certain
provisions. Interestingly, after careful consideration of the
Model Law the line between the alternative and preclusive
character of provisions even becomes more vague. In Articles 4,
13(2) and 16(2) of the Model Law, which we have already observed to be preclusionary as to effect on the post-award stage,
the drafters have used “shall” as a possible indication for such
preclusiveness. However, in relation to Articles 13(3), 16(3) and
34, the drafters only used “may” language. This could indeed be
used as an indication towards interpreting Article 16(3) as an
alternative remedy. However, we should not forget that the
text of this provision was highly influenced by Article 13(3),
which, although it uses “may,” has been consistently interpreted as preclusionary.
Based on the above, while the language used in Article
16(3) could be a strong indication of the alternative nature of
the provision, drawing conclusions merely on this fact is insufficient and more detailed analysis of its character is needed.

187

ABC Co v. XYZ co. Ltd, [2003] S.G.H.C. 107, [2003] 3 S.L.R.(R) 546,
¶9 (May 8, 2003) (Singapore),
188
BROCHES, supra note 122, at 86.
189
BERGER, supra note 68, at 365.
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2. Time limit of Article 16(3) of the Model Law
Generally, failure to raise a challenge against the preliminary decision on the jurisdiction within the time limit prevents
parties doing so in setting aside or enforcement proceedings.190
As clarified by Poudret and Besson, Section 73 of the English
Arbitration Act of 1996191 bars challenge of jurisdictional rulings during the annulment or enforcement stage if such a challenge had not been raised within the set time limit.192 While
England is generally not a Model Law jurisdiction, the English
Arbitration Act “essentially adopted the solution of the model
Law”193 and is explicitly indicative of preclusion if the time limit is disregarded. In addition, we have also identified the general framework of preclusions under the Model Law, which
pays greater importance to short time limits that result in preclusion.
Summary Records of the Working Group demonstrate extensive discussions on the time limit to raise the challenge under Article 16(3).194 While the means of recourse under Articles
16(3) and 34 could be deemed similar, the time limit for raising
a challenge under the former is considerably shorter.195 According to Greenberg, this can be understood because these two
challenges operate under different circumstances and a short
time limit under Article 16(3) may be justified with the need
for early identification of the jurisdiction issue.196
190

Greenberg, supra note 132, at 78.
Arbitration Act 1996, Chapter 23, § 73(2) (1996) (U.K.): “Where the arbitral tribunal rules that it has substantive jurisdiction and a party to arbitral proceedings who could have questioned that ruling (a) by any available
arbitral process of appeal or review, or (b) by challenging the award, does not
do so, or does not do so within the time allowed by the arbitration agreement
or any provision of this Part, he may not object later to the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction on any ground which was the subject of that ruling.”
192
POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 51, at 405.
193
Id.
194
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Summary records for meetings on
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, at 45859, ¶¶13-28, [1985] Y.B. UNCITRAL Vol. XVI, 320th Meeting (Jun. 12,
1985),
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_travaux.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2015).
195
Greenberg, supra note 132, at 63.
196
Id.
191
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The prevailing view among scholars has been to attribute
utmost importance to the time limit and to prohibit a party to
bring a challenge in later proceedings if such a time limit has
not been observed.197 German scholars take the position that
failure to make use of the challenge procedure under Article
16(3)198 within one month excludes any further reliance on the
ground of challenge in later proceedings.199 The rationale behind such a conclusion was the existence of the time limit to
raise challenge, which loses relevance if it does not result in
preclusion to raise further challenges.200 Other scholars also
have explicitly stated that “missing the statutory deadline
means that a party loses it right” 201 of challenging jurisdictional ruling. The Supreme Court of New South Wales judgment concludes on the preclusionary nature of Article 16(3) of
the Model Law, primarily basing its argumentation on important weight of time limit.202 Indeed, the limitation of the
analysis could be the fact that failure to bring a challenge within a timeline bars parties from bringing this challenge after expiry. This is not automatically the same as being precluded
from using other possible remedies. Whether this is true will
further be analyzed in chapter 4 below. However establishing
such a short time limit definitely indicates the underlying purpose of the Model Law of early determination of jurisdictional
rulings.
As a result of the observations made above, it may be concluded that firstly, a preliminary ruling is subject to exclusive
recourse under Article 16(3) of the Model Law notwithstanding
the form of such a ruling. Secondly, non-mandatory language
used in Article 16(3) could be an element towards indication of
197

POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 51, at 405.
See German ZPO, § 1040(3).
199
Stefan Michael Kröll & Peter Kraft, § 1059 - Application for Setting
Aside, in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 436, at 459,
¶57 (Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Stefan M. Kröll & Patricia Nacimiento eds.,
2007).
200
Id. at 460, ¶107; Hanefeld, supra note 50, at 531, ¶7.238.
201
GREENBERG, KEE & WEERAMANTRY, supra note 166, at 237, ¶5.127.
202
TeleMates (previously Better Telecom) Pty Ltd v. Standard SoftTel
Solutions Pvt. Ltd., [2011] NSWSC 1365, ¶53 (Nov. 11, 2011) (Austl.) [hereinafter “TeleMates”].
198
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its alternative rather then preclusive nature and finally, a
short time limit established for challenging the preliminary
ruling gives a strong signal towards the intent of the drafters
to limit jurisdictional rulings to early stages of arbitral proceedings.
V. CHALLENGE UNDER ARTICLE 16(3) OF THE MODEL LAW
BEING “ONE-SHOT REMEDY”

This article has already discussed the general framework of the
Model Law in terms of “choice of remedies” policy as well as preclusion and respective effects on post-award stages. In addition,
the research has further identified the purpose of Article 16(3) to
be aimed at early determination of jurisdictional issues as well as
analyzing different effects on the preclusiveness of Article 16(3).
Keeping in mind the discussion on language and time limit of Article 16(3) of the Model Law is also of utmost importance.
In the present chapter, by looking at the travaux, literature, and case law, the author will firstly analyze whether Article 16(3) of the Model Law may fall under the general “choice
of remedies” policy and subsequently will establish its preclusiveness during set aside and enforcement proceedings.
A. Effect of “choice of remedies” policy on Article 16(3) of the
Model Law
The most crucial point for understanding the nature of the
Model Law is to determine whether it falls under the system of
“choice of remedies” or is to be understood in light of the general framework of preclusions identified in section 2. The Singapore Court of Appeal, while concluding the former, itself clarified that “it is plausible that even within a system of ‘choice of
remedies’ only certain active remedies can exist alongside passive remedies.”203
The court in Lippo v. Astro pointed out several parts of the
travaux and demonstrated that Article 16(3) is not an exception
from a “choice of remedies” policy. Firstly, it referred to Norway’s suggestion of flexibility in the court’s control of jurisdic203

Lippo v. Astro [2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶105.
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tional rulings.204 Indeed, the proposal was to include that the
jurisdiction of the tribunal may be contested only in an action
to set aside under Article 34 or as a defense against an action
for recognition or enforcement of the award.205 Furthermore,
both Norway and the IBA suggested the stipulation that: “a
ruling by an arbitral tribunal that it has jurisdiction could also
be contested by way of defence against recognition or enforcement of the award.”206 While still referring to the draft of the
text that allowed the possibility of reviewing the preliminary
award only during setting aside proceedings, the Analytical
Commentary clarified the matter on both above stated suggestions:
The solution adopted in article 16(3) is that also in this case judicial control may be sought only after the award on the merits is
rendered, namely in setting aside proceedings (and, although this
is not immediately clear from the present text [footnote omitted],
in any recognition or enforcement proceedings).207

Contrary to the interpretation of the Singapore Court of
Appeal,208 none of the above mentioned, including the Analytical Commentary, can be used as grounds for reasoning that Article 16(3) falls within the “choice of remedies” policy. All parts
of the travaux referred to above and highlighted by the court
were in relation to the drafts of Article 16(3) that contained the
possibility of challenge only at a post-award stage through setting aside proceedings.209 Having in mind the discussion in section 1.3 and the determination of general policy of “choice of
remedies” between setting aside and enforcement proceedings,
none of the proposals discussed above come as a surprise. In
204

Id. ¶106.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/263, supra note 78, at 29, ¶7(b).
206
Id. at 30, ¶8.
207
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/264, supra note 30, at 40, ¶12.
208
Lippo v. Astro, [2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶109: “it was understood that a
party might choose not to challenge the preliminary ruling on jurisdiction at
the setting aside stage and yet raise that same challenge in enforcement proceedings.”
209
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246, supra note 76, art. 16(3), at 13, ¶49:“The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. In either case, a
ruling by the arbitral tribunal that it has jurisdiction may be contested by any
party only in an action for setting aside the arbitral award.”
205
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fact, the important point that the Singapore Court of Appeal
failed to indicate was that immediate court review under Article 16(3) appeared in the text of the Model Law only at the end.
All subsequent commentaries by countries, the Analytical
Commentary as well as the Report of the Commission, concerned post-award stage challenge procedure. The reason for
omission in interpretation of the travaux by the Singaporean
court could be due to the fact, that representatives of Astro
never made this point available to the court.
While the Singapore court based its decision on the inapplicable part of travaux, it should be pointed out that there are
explicit indications to the contrary. After amending the text of
the Model Law to reflect immediate court review, the travaux
draws a clear line between the challenge mechanism under Article 16(3) being the sole recourse on the one side and “choice of
remedies” available between setting aside and enforcement
proceedings on the other side:
“Where the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that
it has jurisdiction, article 16(3) provides for instant court control
in order to avoid unnecessary waste of money and time. [..] In
those less common cases where the arbitral tribunal combines its
decision on jurisdiction with an award on the merits, judicial review on the question of jurisdiction is available in setting aside
proceedings under article 34 or in enforcement proceedings under
article 36.”210

The same document in subsequent paragraphs again explicitly reiterates the choice available between setting aside
and enforcement proceedings, without any similar language
used in relation to Article 16(3).211 Therefore, nothing in the
travaux is suggestive of its alternative nature or that it falls
under a “choice of remedies” policy of the Model Law. The
whole drafting process rather demonstrates that the mechanism of immediate court review was formed as “unique”212 and
“sui generis”213 nature falling outside the general policy. Gary
210

U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/309, supra note 77, at 120, ¶25 (emphasis added).
Id. at 122, ¶41.
212
JEFF WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 1268 (2012).
213
Huber, supra note 97, at 257, ¶4; Vladimir Pavić, (In)Appropriate
Compromise: Article 16(3) of the Model Law and its Progeny, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY,
211
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Born, in the latest edition of his book, has qualified Article
16(3) to be “specialized judicial review” highlighting that positive judicial rulings are only subject to such review mechanism.214 For the sake of fulfilling the main purpose of timely
resolution of jurisdictional matters and obtaining legal certainty on this issue, it seems that Article 16(3) of the Model Law
was designed to be “carved out” from the system of “choice of
remedies.”215
B. Consequences of the failure to seek immediate court review
under Article 16(3) on the post-award stage
Coming to the final part of the analysis, having determined
that Article 16(3) of the Model Law is excluded from the general “choice of remedies” policy, this article will provide an
overview of case law and literature to determine the preclusive
effect on the post-award stage.
1. Overview of case law on the preclusionary effect of Article
16(3) of the Model Law
Generally, existence of case law on a particular matter
does not automatically make it relevant for all circumstances.
As noted earlier, German legislation explicitly disregards
“choice of remedies” policy. If the research of this article had
led towards the assumption that Article 16(3) of the Model Law
fell under “choice of remedies” policy, relevance of German case
law would have been decreased. However, for the purposes of
this analysis, the weight of German cases is not undermined
and relevant observations of courts may be relied upon.
As indicated earlier, the leading position of German courts
on this issue stems from the landmark case of the German
Federal Supreme Court from 2003.216 This case was brought
CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION 387, 409 (Stefan M. Kröll, Loukas A. Mistelis,
Viscasillas P. Perales & Vikki M. Rogers eds., 2011).
214
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 3019 (2d ed.
2014); See also Lawrence G. S. Boo, Ruling on Arbitral Jurisdiction — Is that
an Award?, 3 ASIAN INT’L ARB. J. 125, 140 (2007).
215
Lippo v. Astro, [2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶104.
216
Bundesgerichtshof, supra note 48.
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before the Supreme Court to review the decision of the 9th Civil
Division of the Higher Regional Court of Oldenburg of November 15, 2002 regarding the declaration of enforceability of the
arbitral award. The Federal Supreme Court clarified the nature of § 1040(3) of German ZPO, referring to the history of
adopting the provision, emphasized its purposes to ensure that
the jurisdictional question is clarified at an early stage of the
proceedings. Keeping in mind such a purpose and the intention
of the legislator, the court concluded that in the absence of a
explicit indication on the preclusive nature of § 1040(3) in ZPO,
such effect is still “clear from the meaning and purpose of §
1040 ZPO” as effective “even for proceedings before the state
court to set aside the award and to grant execution.”217
Shortly after the decision of the Federal Supreme Court,
the High Regional Court of Celle upheld the principle of preclusion established in the above mentioned case and reiterated the
preclusive effect of § 1040 of German ZPO. 218 The case arose
out of a contract concluded between the parties for the delivery
of 16,000 tone of bitumen. After the non-performance of the defendant, the claimant initiated arbitral proceedings before
CIETAC, as per arbitration clause of the contract. The defendant objected to the competence of the tribunal and did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. After rendering an
award in favor of the claimant, the defendant moved before the
High Regional Court of Celle to refuse enforcement of the foreign award under Article V(1)(a) of the NY Convention. The
court clarified that the case dealing with foreign award was different than the situation with domestic international award.
The court observed that, had NY Convention contained similar
challenge procedures as those of § 1040 of German ZPO, then
the defendant would have been precluded from its defense of an
invalid arbitration agreement.219
While a number of other German courts have taken the
same attitude towards exclusiveness of challenge under Article

217

Id.
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Celle, Sept. 04,
2003, 8 Sch 11/02, SchiedsVZ 2004, 165 (Ger.) in 15 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 528
(2005).
219
Id.
218
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16(3) of the Model Law,220 the reasoning of the High Regional
Court of Köln221 is worth noting. In an application for annulment of two arbitral awards, the court observed that reasons of
legal certainty require limitation of the power to assert a challenge to an arbitration agreement and to preclude a party from
asserting such a challenge when the latter, with the knowledge
of reasons for a challenge, continues to arbitrate.222 The court
further noted that: “under no circumstance should the claimant
be allowed to maneuver in such a way with the practice of deferring his challenge and making his challenge dependent on
the result of the arbitration.”223
Canadian courts, in dealing with the same issue, have
come to underline the exclusivity of the Article 16(3) challenge
and its preclusive nature. The Supreme Court of Quebec, in the
case of Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Libyan Arab Airlines, has ruled that the only possibility to challenge the preliminary award is by way of Article 943.1 of the Quebec Code of
Civil Procedure (hereinafter “QCCP”), which in essence is an
adoption of Article 16(3) of the Model Law.224 Although the application of Article 943.1 QCCP had been excluded in this case,
the court still proceeded and determined that the challenge
procedure available through the article is the sole mean of contesting the jurisdictional ruling.225 In another case, Regionale
ARL v. Ghanotakis, the Supreme Court of Quebec highlighted
220

Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Oldenburg, Nov.
15, 2002, 9 SchH 9/02, 2002 (Ger.). Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Bremen, Nov. 10, 2005, 2 Sch 2/2005, BeckRS 2005, 32835 (Ger.).
221
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Köln, Nov. 21,
2008, 19 Sch 12/08, BeckRs 2009, 04423(Ger.).
222
Id. ¶22.
223
Id.
224
Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, 1994, c. 73 art. 943.1 (Can.): “If the
arbitrators declare themselves competent during the arbitration proceedings, a
party may within 30 days of being notified thereof apply to the court for a decision on that matter. While such a case is pending, the arbitrators may pursue the arbitration proceedings and make their award.”
225
Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Libyan Arab Airlines, [2000],
R.J.Q. 717 (Feb. 15, 2000) (Can.) http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org/
index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=963); see also HENRI C. ALVAREZ, NEIL
KAPLAN & DAVID W. RIVKIN, MODEL LAW DECISIONS, CASES APPLYING THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 29
(2003).
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the fact that the plaintiffs had not challenged the preliminary
award on jurisdiction within the timeline stipulated under Article 943.1 QCCP.226 The Court concluded that due to such failure, the plaintiffs were precluded from requesting to set aside
an award on the ground of lack of arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court of New South Wales, in TeleMates Pty
Ltd v. Standard SoftTel Solutions Pvt Ltd, highlighted the importance of 30-day time limit and reached a similar conclusion
to the courts mentioned above.227 The court observed that the
Model Law had not included any provision on an extension of
the time limit and that ignoring it would go against the objects
that: “disputes which the parties have submitted to arbitration
should be speedily resolved and that intervention of the Court
should be minimized.”228
It is also noteworthy, that in the case of China Nanhai Oil
Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. Ltd, which did not concern Article 16(3) of the Model
Law, the Hong Kong High Court still observed the preclusive
nature of Article 16(3) of the Model Law by stating that:
[U]nder Art 16(3) if the tribunal rules that it has jurisdiction any
party may request within 30 days, the court to decide the matter.
It seems to follow from this that if you do not seek the view of the
court, then you cannot raise the matter subsequently at [the] enforcement stage.229

In light of this stream of cases, Singapore courts have taken different position not only in Lippo v. Astro but also in Tan
Poh Leng Stanley v. Tang Boon Jek Jeffrey.230 Although not
faced with the necessity of any interpretation of challenge procedure under Article 16(3) of the Model Law, as no preliminary
ruling was issued in that case, the High Court still observed
that challenge of a preliminary decision on jurisdiction “is an
option demonstrated by the construction of words “may request”. It finally concluded that failure to raise a challenge un226

ARL Regional Print Ltd. and Rene Laporte v. George Ghanotakis and
Jean M. Won, [2004] CanLII 23270 4, ¶18 (Sept. 13, 2004) (Can.) [hereinafter
“ARL Regional Print”].
227
TeleMates, supra note 202, at ¶53.
228
Id.
229
China Nanhai Oil, supra note 64, at 676.
230
Tan Poh Leng, supra note 184, at ¶1.
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der Article 16(3) of the Model Law does not bar a challenge by
an application to set aside the award on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.”231
Lastly, the High Court of Hong Kong in the case of Fung
Sang Trading Limited made an interesting interpretation.232
While discussing the avenues for challenge of jurisdiction, the
court observed that preliminary ruling is subject to a final review under Article 16(3). However, the court further noted
that: “the tribunal's decision may later be considered in an application to set aside the award under art 34 and although art
36 does not apply in Hong Kong (being part of Chapter VIII),
the enforcement of the award may be refused under the New
York.” This interpretation however seems to be contradictory in
itself, since once the court would decide the matter under Article 16(3) of the Model Law, such question would become res judicata on the subsequent proceedings.233
In light of the above case law, although Singapore courts
tend to keep remedies available in order to cause arbitration in
Singapore to “flourish” and to make it a more attractive place
for arbitration, the prevailing position from other courts tends
to lead towards the opposite conclusion. Courts from various
jurisdictions referred to above, have preliminarily confirmed
the preclusive nature of Article 16(3) of the Model Law in light
of the primary purpose behind the mechanism of early determination of jurisdictional issues, legal certainty and efficiency.
However, due regard has also been paid to short time limits
available for recourse, interpreted as one of the indications of
preclusiveness. Although non-mandatory language, as determined in section 3.3.1, could be used as an affirmation for the
alternative nature of the remedy, all the courts apart from the
Singapore courts tend to read “may” language in light of the
exclusive purpose existing behind it.

231

Id.
Fung Sang Trading Limited v. Kai Sun Sea Products,[1991] 2 H.K.C.
526 (Oct. 29, 1991) (Hong Kong).
233
ARL Regional Print, supra note 226, ¶8-9.
232
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2. Scholarly opinion on preclusiveness of Article 16(3) of the
Model Law
While a number of scholars have dealt with the issue of
preclusiveness of Article 16(3) of the Model Law, as opposed to
the analysis provided in this article, all observations have solely been based on the case law without looking at the question
in light of the system of “choice of remedies.” Still the question
is debated.
One part of legal scholarship seems to support the alternative nature of Article 16(3) of the Model Law. In order to maintain the argument of interpreting Article 16(3) as a choice, the
Singapore Court of Appeal referred to a commentary by Holtzmann and Neuhaus:234
The arbitral tribunal’s power is neither exclusive nor final. Its
decision is subject, first, to immediate review by a court under
Article 16(3), second, to later court review in a setting aside procedure under Article 34, and, third, to still later review in an action for recognition and enforcement under Article 36.235

The plain reading of the stated quotation, in the eyes of the
author, does not lead towards a conclusion of alternative nature of Article 16(3) of the Model Law. It rather induces questions similar to the Fung Sang Trading Limited judgment,236
whether post-award stage remedies are still available “later”
after using the challenge mechanism under Article 16(3) of the
Model Law. The answer to such interpretation clearly falls under the principle of res judicata.237 However, if a different interpretation is to be given to this statement then the authors
clearly support the non-preclusive nature of Article 16(3) of the
Model Law. Furthermore, Dr. Aron Broches, in commenting
Article 16(3) also stipulates that: “after having raised the plea
before the arbitral tribunal the party in question has a choice
between either seeking a decision from the Art. 6 court under
paragraph (3) or raising the issue in proceedings under Arts. 34
234

Lippo v. Astro, [2013] S.G.C.A. 57, ¶120.
HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, supra note 22, at 479.
236
Fung Sang Trading, supra note 232.
237
See Anne-Catherine Hahn, Chapter III: The Award and the Courts,
Res Judicata as a Challenge for Arbitral Tribunals, in AUST. Y.B. ON INT. ARB.
2014 329, 329-30 (Christian Klausegger, Peter Klein, et. al. eds., 2014).
235
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and 36.”238 However, it seems that the only Singapore court, after failure to observe all the pertinent travaux, including those
of Article 16(3) under “choice of remedies” policy, tend to support interpretation of the mentioned authors.
The second and greater part of the legal scholarship, support the preclusive nature of Article 16(3) of the Model Law.
Prof. Dr. Alan Uzelac has observed that the concept of Article
16(3) could not envisage multiple court proceedings on the
same jurisdictional issue.239 In commenting on Russian adoption of the Model Law, it has been noted that the court has the
power to intervene “to finally decide the competence of the arbitral tribunal - Article 16(3).”240 Interestingly, before the Lippo v. Astro judgment, even Singapore’s adoption of Article 16(3)
of the Model Law was understood to be the last word on the jurisdictional question and to put “to rest the controversy surrounding the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to determine his own
jurisdiction.”241
In relation to section 1040(3) of German ZPO, scholars
have stated that “lack of a challenge to such ruling within the
one month time period ... excludes any reliance on that ground
in later setting aside proceedings.”242 Prof. Klaus Peter Berger
further clarifies that even in cases where there is express reservation of the right to challenge in post-award stages, after
the 30-day time limit is expired, the question becomes venire
contra factum proprium, and makes parties barred from raising the challenge subsequently.243 Taking into account the importance of time limit and the express desire of the drafters to
obtain certainty on the jurisdictional matter at an early stage,
constructing Article 16(3) of the Model Law as preclusionary
only seems logical.
Furthermore, Prof. Jeffrey Waincymer explains that Article 16(3) of the Model Law has taken the approach that the su238

BROCHES, supra note 122, at 88.
Uzelac, supra note 174, at 163.
240
Kaj Hobér, Arbitration in Moscow, 3 ARB. INT’L 119, 157 (1987).
241
Mohan R. Pillay, The Singapore Arbitration Regime and the
UNCITRAL Model Law, 20 ARB. INT’L 355, 368, ¶(iv) (2004).
242
Kröll & Kraft, supra note 199, at 459, ¶57.
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pervisory court at the seat has the last word on the jurisdictional question.244 Final determination of jurisdiction at the
seat of arbitration has been reiterated by others, based on the
economical reasons, not to proceed to merits without having jurisdiction.245 Even the Singapore Court of Appeal in Lippo v.
Astro observed that: “it appears to us that there is a policy of
the Model Law to achieve certainty and finality in the seat of
arbitration.”246 However, all of the above mentioned would indeed not necessarily induce understanding of the court under
the procedure of Article 16(3) to have the final word. It could be
argued that application for vacatur of the award under Article
34 could also obtain the same finality and certainty at the
“seat.” Nevertheless, if such choice were to be left in favor of
challenge during setting aside proceedings, the purpose behind
adopting the specialized immediate court review mechanism
would be refuted. The Article 34 remedy was already in place
without further need to design the mechanism under Article
16(3) of the Model Law.
Furthermore, if finality and certainty at the seat of arbitration is accepted, then the Singapore Court of Appeal strikes
against its own conclusion allowing for a “passive” remedy under Article 36 of the Model Law to still apply. Since domestic
international award’s enforcement also takes place at the seat
under Article 36 of the Model Law,247 it is somewhat unclear
how desired certainty could be challenged via “passive remedy”
of enforcement. Interestingly, in support of its conclusion, the
Singapore Court of Appeal interpreted QCCP to also provide
for the possibility to refuse enforcement of a domestic international award (homologation) in the same framework as Singapore.248 However, the court failed to observe that relevant case
244
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246
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247
It has been stated before that “Section 3 of its International Arbitration Act provides that the Model law has force of law in Singapore but Articles 35 and 36 of the model Law are expressly excluded” Singapore Court of
Appeal extended Article 35 and 36 to apply. See GREENBERG, KEE &
WEERAMANTRY supra note 166, at 451, ¶9.139.
248
While application for annulment would be the only possible recourse
against an arbitration award under Article 947 of Quebec Law but still leav245
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law from Quebec goes against the alleged “choice of remedies”
policy extension to Article 16(3) and takes the stance of a preclusionary nature of Article 16(3).
Finally, for policy purposes, making the recourse of Article
16(3) merely optional would serve as a promotion of bad faith
actions by obstructing the arbitral process and its enforcement
by keeping silent and raising objections only after they lose. In
the realm of ambiguity as to the preclusive nature of Article
16(3) of the Model Law, to avoid possible opportunistic behaviors from the parties, the tribunal’s jurisdiction should no longer be subject to further challenges at setting aside or enforcement proceedings in the case of unfavorable award on the
merits.249 Keeping in mind the sui generis mechanism of Article 16(3) and the underlying purposes behind its adoption, the
article concludes that it is to be considered as “one shot” remedy which as noted by Prof. Klaus Peter Berger, decides the jurisdiction “once and for all”250 at least within the seat of arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article provided analysis of the preclusionary character of Article 16(3) of the Model Law, which grants parties the
right to immediate court review of the preliminary jurisdictional ruling of the tribunal. While the Model Law itself fails to
provide explicit answers on the consequences of failure to raise
the challenge within the timeline provided in Article 16(3), diverging interpretations and positions existing in various Model
Law jurisdictions as well as among legal scholarship has been
observed.
The author has used the case from Singapore providing
far-reaching interpretation of Article 16(3) as the departure
point of the analysis of this article. As opposed to what already
had been written in the literature in relation to Article 16(3) of
the Model Law, this article analyzed the preclusive nature of
ing the grounds for refusal of enforcement under Article 946 and retaining
“choice of remedies” policy. See Lippo v. Astro, [2013] SGCA 57, ¶78-81.
249
ERK, supra note 163, at 188.
250
BERGER, supra note 68, at 365.
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Article 16(3) from all dimensions. Subsequent to determination
of lack of clarity on preclusionary matters under the NY Convention, the article solely focused on the analysis within the
system of the Model Law. While analyzing the pertinent
travaux and case law, the article identified the co-existence of
two rather conflicting frameworks. Namely, while the Model
Law allows for choice between “active” and “passive” remedies,
it also establishes strict preclusion rules on waiver as well as
challenge procedures closely analogous to Article 16(3) of the
Model Law. Moreover, it has been established that the effect of
such preclusions also extends to the post-award stages.
For an accurate understanding of what lies at the heart of
Article 16(3) of the Model Law, the article identified the main
purpose of the challenge mechanism as early determination of
jurisdictional challenges and obtaining legal certainty on the
question of jurisdiction. For fulfillment of such purposes, only
the character of preliminary decisions without regard to the
form of the ruling is decisive for the Article 16(3) mechanism to
come into play. Thus the Article 34 recourse of setting aside is
limited only to final awards. Another important element of
immediate court review, serving the purpose indicated above, is
the specific short timeframe for the possibility to raise the challenge. Both case law and literature supported the importance
of this factor.
Distinctiveness of this research was mostly concerned with
analysis of Article 16(3) within the “choice of remedies” policy
of the Model Law. After detailed examination of the travaux,
contrary to the conclusion reached by Singapore Court of Appeal, the present article leaned towards concluding that drafters of the Model Law designed sui generis mechanism under
Article 16(3) and excluded from the policy of alternative remedies. In light of such determination, a close look at case law
and literature on the question directed the conclusion on preclusiveness of the Article 16(3) of the Model Law to be positive.
Since allowing later challenges would defeat the purpose of
guaranteeing certainty on jurisdictional rulings at an early
stage for avoidance of bad faith actions from the parties, Article
16(3) challenge seems to represent “one shot remedy.” While
the relevant procedural rights during enforcement of awards in
foreign countries under the NY Convention is still under ques-
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tion, at least parties may be sure to have the final word on the
jurisdictional ruling after expiration of the 30 day time limit at
the seat of arbitration. In light of the final result of the article,
although the interpretation of Lippo v. Astro was to serve the
purposes of “flourishing of arbitration in Singapore,”251 it may
to the contrary create greater ambiguity among the parties and
allow obstruction of arbitral proceedings and the post-award
stage.
In the author’s opinion, the Model Law, by leaving a lacuna in Article 16(3), defeats the purpose of the Model Law as
“readily understandable by people of very different legal cultures.”252 If the interpretation given by the Singapore Court of
Appeal is to be followed by other courts as well, the process of
jurisdictional challenges will promote last minute attacks to
“leave no stone unturned”253 after the result of the case becomes known to the parties. As one of the primary concerns of
the drafters of Model Law was “not to confront the parties with
unexpected and surprising legal consequences”254 leeway for
opportunistic behaviors should not be part of the modern international commercial arbitration.
As a result of the research and the reached conclusion, it is
suggested that it might be the right time for additional changes
to the Model Law in order to achieve the necessary degree of
certainty on the question of jurisdiction and to obtain clarity as
to available remedies to the parties. Desired uniformity and
harmonization between the Model Law and the NY Convention
require periodic changes. As the arbitration community has
witnessed, none of the proposed amendments of the NY Convention have taken place, while the last amendment to the text
of the Model Law was made in 2006. Such practical possibility
of modifications in the Model law brings confidence to the author in concluding that the next round of changes is desired on
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many points being subject to continuous discussion.255
Indeed, the limitation of the proposed recommendation
could be due to the fact that all Model Law jurisdictions would
have to amend their domestic legislations. However, in the
view of the author, this is not necessarily precise. By its nature
a “Model” of a desired national law on international arbitration, countries would not have to make actual amendments
within their jurisdictions (unless desired). To the contrary,
amendments in the Model Law could draw a clear-cut line in
the interpretation of necessary provisions and the courts would
have less flexibility as in case of the Singapore Court of Appeal.
Such opinions follow the position of Dr. Klaus Peter Berger
that “every change or supplementation of the original structure
or language of the Model Law has to take into account the important signaling effect that the adoption of the law is intended
to have on foreign arbitral practitioners and parties.”256 Due to
such important effect, weighing different considerations towards each other should be resolved towards explicit clarification of issues of such significance as determining available
remedies of the parties and possible consequences of their
(in)actions.

255

For the purposes of the article, to limit conclusion with Article 16 only, there are various issues except for preclusionary effect of the failure to
raise the challenge. To name but a few, form to be given to preliminary ruling
on positive as well as negative jurisdictional rulings, effects of negative jurisdictional ruling and available recourse against the latter, standard of review
under Article 16(3), etc. See, e.g., Kröll, supra note 13, at 55; Pavić, supra
note 213, at 395.
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